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  A “market” can be rigorously and precisely defined quantitatively, but the information to 
do so is typically not available.  Instead, markets are often defined based on qualitative 
information, leading to the possibility of errors.  I make some practical suggestions to mitigate 
such errors.  When markets are correctly defined, it is the change in market shares that is central to 
the antitrust analysis, though this is not how courts typically use market definition and shares to 
analyze Section 2 cases.  Unfortunately, there is only a weak link between change in market share 
and change in competitive performance, and that is why market definition and the use of market 
shares are very crude tools of analysis.  That is why their best use is as safe harbors to quickly 
screen out frivolous cases from those where the economic forces governing industry behavior need 
to be carefully studied.  But, I explain why even this use of market definition and market shares 
can be problematic in Section 2 cases.   Market definition and the market shares based on it continue to be a central focus of many 
antitrust cases.  This is so despite the well understood limitations of such a methodology in 
providing an accurate guide to the competitiveness of an industry.  The simplicity of the 
methodology is both its strength and weakness.  Its strength is that it is easy to understand and seems 
intuitively correct – high market shares indicate that competition is weak, while low ones indicate 
the reverse.  The weakness of the methodology is its failure to identify when high market shares may 
in fact not convey accurate information about an industry’s competitiveness, or conversely when 
low market shares can mask a lack of competition.   Although some may call for the elimination of 
the methodology as an analytic tool because of its limitations, its great strength is that it may prevent 
decision-makers from making egregious errors.  I think its best use is to provide safe harbors so that 
firms in relatively competitive industries are not harassed with senseless antitrust suits and, if they 
are, such suits can be dispensed with at summary judgment. 
  A “market” can be rigorously and precisely defined quantitatively, but the information to do 
so is typically not available.  Instead, markets are often defined based on qualitative information, 
leading to the possibility of errors.  I make some practical suggestions to mitigate such errors.  When 
markets are correctly defined, it is the change in market shares that is central to the antitrust analysis, 
though this is not how courts typically use market definition and shares to analyze Section 2 cases.  
Unfortunately, there is only a weak link between change in market share and change in competitive 
performance, and that is why market definition and the use of market shares are very crude tools of 
analysis.  That is why their best use is as safe harbors to quickly screen out frivolous cases from 
those where the economic forces governing industry behavior need to be carefully studied.  But, I 
explain why even this use of market definition and market shares can be problematic in Section 2 
cases.   2
  Although market definition, together with the calculation of market shares, is a crude 
methodology, if it is to be used, there are certain logical principles that one should follow.  
Otherwise, this methodology will become even cruder or, worse yet, misleading.  Once one has 
defined a market, one must understand why market shares are a very imprecise way of 
characterizing competition, and are, at most, the beginning point for an analysis, not the end point.  
The government agencies responsible for antitrust, the Federal Trade Commission and Department 
of Justice, recognize this limitation – it is explicit in the Merger Guidelines, for example – but 
courts often have less experience in antitrust matters and that can create problems with the use of 
market shares. 
  This paper is organized as follows.  Section II explains the purpose of m arket definition, 
namely the identification of “market power”, a term whose meaning is often ambiguous.  The 
section explains that it is the change, not the level, of market power that is relevant in most 
antitrust cases.  Despite this, most single firm conduct (henceforth, Section 2) cases focus on the 
level of market power, a calculation for which market definition surprisingly turns out to be 
particularly problematic.
1  Section III explains how economic theory combined with applicable 
assumptions tells us precisely what we want to know about the economic effect of mergers, cartels 
and various types of Section 2 behavior.   Using Section III as a framework, Section IV explains 
the economic principles underlying market definition and market share analysis, emphasizing the 
sometimes extreme information requirements one must have to define markets, or lacking that 
information the arbitrariness of market definition.  This analysis naturally leads to a discussion of 
the limitations of market definition and market shares as tools to use to arrive at the correct answer.   
It pays special attention to feasibility of implementation, and discusses merger and Section 2 cases 
                                                 
1 Some of what I label single firm conduct cases (e.g., tying, vertical restraints) are covered by Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.  I mean to include those cases when I refer to “Section 2” cases.   3
separately.  Section V explains how market definition can be a useful research tool, while Section 
VI discusses some common mistakes made in applying market definition.   Section VII describes 
how one would apply market definition in two complicated settings:  one where R & D is central 
and the other where goods are interrelated as complements, such as in “two-sided” markets where 
different market participants exert strong effects on each other.  Section VIII concludes with a 
discussion of how the best use of market definition and market shares is as a safe harbor. 
 
II.  What is the Purpose of Market Definition? 
This section makes four points.  First, it answers what the goal of market definition is, 
namely to measure “market power.”  Second, it explains an ambiguity in the definition of market 
power.  Third, it explains why it is the change in market power, not the level of market power, that 
is relevant to most antitrust analyses.  Finally, it explains the limitations of using predicted 
changes in market shares to estimate the change in market power. 
Markets are defined so that when one calculates the share that a firm (or group of firms) 
comprise, one can assess whether that firm has significant “market power”.  Roughly speaking, 
“market power” means that the industry’s behavior deviates from perfect competition.  One 
standard definition of market power is the ability to set price profitability above the competitive 
level, which is usually taken to mean marginal cost.  For this definition to make sense there must 
be a possibility that competition could establish the “competitive level.”  Let’s suppose that is so – 
for example consider an industry where there are constant returns to scale (it costs C to produce 
each unit) and many firms.  We can contrast price in that industry to an industry with only one (or 
a few firms) and ask whether the price in the latter case is above the competitive price, C.  If it is, 
we can then ask whether the deviation is big enough to be considered a “significant” enough 
deviation from the competitive level to justify an antitrust concern that could trigger an antitrust   4
intervention as, for example, when the market power is created by merger or some other action.  Of 
course, any such intervention carries the risk that the decision will be in error and will do more 
harm than good. 
  As far as I know, there are no judicial standards to determine how large a deviation of 
price from C constitutes “significant.”  The consequence of declaring a specific deviation level as 
“significant” is that antitrust decisions based on market shares will be made and therefore a 
decision theoretic framework in which one trades off the expected costs of type I and type II errors 
is the only one capable of answering the question of what constitutes a “significant” level.  I have 
never seen any quantitative attempt to use such a framework to answer the question of how large a 
deviation of price from  C should be considered “significant.”  Furthermore, there is a time 
dimension that must also be analyzed.  For how long should a price elevated above marginal cost 
persist before we attach the label “significant”?  Answers to these questions can be specified based 
not on any such quantitative assessment but based on what “seems” reasonable.  So, for example, 
Areeda and Turner (1978, vol. 2 P. 347) suggest using a 5% threshold in a discussion about what 
might constitute a significant price increase.
2 
 Before readily accepting this 5% threshold, I note that numerous attempts to measure the 
gap between price and marginal cost estimate gaps in excess of 5% for industries that many would 
consider to be relatively competitive in that there is free entry and several firms.  Rougly speaking, 
a monopolist facing a demand elasticity of 20 would price at about 5% above constant marginal 
                                                 
2  Notice that if one uses a 5% price deviation (or any specified percent) as a criterion for 
“significant” deviation, then there can be a logical problem.  Consider the following.  Firm A and 
Firm B merge in New York causing prices to rise there from $100 to $105, or a 5% increase.  The 
product is also shipped for $100 to Chicago and therefore, the Chicago price rises from $200 to 
$205, a 2-1/2% price increase.  Is it sensible to say that a New York consumer has suffered a 
significant loss, but not the Chicago one, if each consumes one unit of the product?  The problem 
arises because a percent criterion does not measure the deadweight loss to society, nor does it 
measure the harm to consumers. 
   5
cost, but many (most?) firms face much lower elasticities.  Perhaps, in light of this, 5% may be ok 
to use to determine whether the change in market power is “significant” but a higher number may 
be appropriate to determine whether the level of market power is “significant”.
 3 
Suppose that unlike the previous example in which a competitive price could be defined, 
the industry is one in which there cannot be an equilibrium where price equals marginal cost.  A 
good example is an industry in which there is a fixed cost of entry and then Cournot competition.  
Suppose further that there is free entry.  The free entry condition guarantees that (economic) profits 
are zero (i.e., a competitive rate of return is earned on capital), but price will exceed C, marginal 
cost.  There is often confusion between pricing at marginal cost and earning zero profits.   In most 
industries, there is a deviation from perfect competition in that price exceeds marginal cost, yet 
free entry can still guarantee zero (expected) economic profit.  Suppose profits are zero yet price 
exceeds marginal cost.  Should we attached the label “market power” to describe this circumstance, 
or should we reserve that label for the case in which price exceeds marginal cost and profits are 
positive?  Alternatively, as my textbook (Carlton and Perloff (2005), P. 93) suggests, should we 
label the first situation as “market power” and the second as “monopoly power”?  Courts and 
analysts often fail to specify what definition they are using. 
The fact that it is difficult to calculate either marginal cost or economic profits foreshadows 
that the direct determination of the level of market power is going to be hard no matter what 
definition is used.  That is one reason why analysts use market share as a proxy for market power, 
but, as we will soon see, it may be no easier to define markets to calculate market share than it is to 
measure market power directly. 
                                                 
3 Marginal cost can be difficult to estimate.  It one approximates it as average variable cost, then one may erroneously 
measure that there is a gap between price and marginal cost when there is none as, for example, when price equals 
marginal and average cost and the marginal cost is upward sloping.  In this situation, average variable cost 
underestimates marginal cost.   6
Although we have been discussing the level of market power, it is the change in market 
power that is (or should be) the focal point of most antitrust analysis.  (This is not quite right.  It is 
the change in welfare that should be the ultimate focus.  But changes in market power can be 
informative about changes in welfare.)   In a merger setting
4, it is a comparison between the market 
power in two different industry structures that one must analyze in order to predict whether price 
will rise post-merger.  For example, all else equal, is a market where there are five firms with 
shares 15, 15, 20, 25, 25 significantly less competitive than a market in which the first two firms 
merge so that there are only four firms with shares 30, 20, 25 and 25?  This strikes me as a well-
posed question.  Notice that the pre-merger level of market power is irrelevant for answering the 
question.  It is only the change in market power that matters.  One can answer a question about the 
change even through one does not know the initial level.  Indeed, one can see why a market power 
definition based on price (P) in excess of marginal cost is particularly convenient to use here.  Let 
2 P  be the post merger price and P1  be the pre-merger price.  The change in market power equals 
(P2-C ) minus ( 1 P  - C ) or P2 –P1.  As long as C is unchanged as a result of the merger, the change 
in market power is measured as the change in prices.  Notice how this approach focuses on the 
change in price (in the absence of other changes).  To the extent that the merger creates 
efficiencies, so that the marginal cost of the merging parties will fall, this will make an analysis 
that focuses only on price in a hypothetical where costs do not change a conservative one in the 
sense that if a merger does not significantly raise price under the assumption of unchanged costs, 
one would reach the same conclusion if one took further account of any cost efficiencies.
5 
                                                 
4 Cartels and mergers involve similar considerations.  For simplicity, I focus on mergers throughout 
the paper. 
 
5 Suppose price rose but quality improved.  Although the next section shows how to handle this 
case precisely, for purposes here one should focus on the quality-adjusted price.  Suppose price 
falls, but not as much as marginal cost.  Consumers and society gain, so there should be no   7
Consider now a Section 2 case in which the issue is whether some alleged bad act (e.g., 
exclusive dealing) harmed competition.  How should one measure whether there is significant 
market power?  Should one measure it before or after the alleged bad act?   Following the same 
logic as in the merger case, one should focus on the change in market power as a result of the 
alleged bad act and ask how much market power exists absent the alleged bad act and compare it to 
the market power that exists with the alleged bad act, keeping all else constant.  The conceptual 
difficulty is that the alleged bad act may have has some efficiency justification, but price must 
typically rise in order to create the incentives to generate the efficiency.  Indeed, an increase in 
market power may be desirable if it enables the firm to provide a higher quality product.
6 
For example, exclusive territories can provide incentives for firms to engage in the 
provision of services by giving them the ability to raise price as a result of the elimination of 
competition.  Therefore, the product characteristics (including service) are not being held constant 
when one compares the price with and without the alleged bad act.  This means that even if the 
alleged bad act is desirable in that it creates incentives for the provision of valued services to at 
least some consumers, and even if there are perfect substitutes to the product both with and without 
services, the analyst who looks at only price will mistakenly conclude that market power is created 
even though none is.  The analyst concludes this because the analyst observes a lower price in the 
absence of the alleged bad act and, therefore, incorrectly reasons that the bad act created additional 
market power.  This is why Section 2 cases can be much more complicated than a typical merger 
                                                                                                                                                                 
antitrust concern even though market power has increased.  Suppose price rose, but some costs 
(e.g., fixed costs) fell.  Then one would have to do a more complicated analysis to determine 
whether total welfare rose if one believes that total welfare, not just consumer surplus, should be 
the proper objective of antitrust.  These examples illustrate that it is the change in welfare, not 
market power, that is the ultimate focus of analysis.  See Carlton (2007) and Heyer (2006). 
 
6 I use “product quality” broadly to include not just the physical characteristic of the product, but 
also the way it is sold.   8
case.  One expects a price increase as a result of the alleged bad act if the alleged bad act harms 
competition, but one could also expect a price increase even when the alleged bad act does not 
harm competition but improves product quality.  Therefore, looking only at the behavior of price 
before and after the alleged bad act does not answer whether the “bad” act really is harmful.  One 
must dig further and examine, for example, in the case of exclusive distribution, whether some 
consumers are served better and whether rival manufacturers can still obtain efficient distribution.  
It is typically hard to trade off the benefit to some consumers from the improved service against the 
harm to others as a result of the elevated price.  Moreover, especially when the services have been 
provided for many years, it would be wrong to postulate that a reduction in price from elimination 
of the special services associated with exclusive territories will not harm consumers.  For the short 
term, that may be so, but eventually as the failure to educate consumers mounts over time, the long 
run impact on demand could be substantial.   
Despite the logic of looking at the change in market power, courts in Section 2 cases often 
inquire about only the level of market power.  In doing so, they are trying to create a safe harbor 
and shortcut the need to investigate whether market power increased and harmed competition.  I 
discuss this point more fully in Section IV.   
Because it is change in market power that is (or should be) the focus of an antitrust analysis, 
when one is using market shares as a proxy for market power one must focus on the change in 
shares that results from some particular antitrust decision.  But it may be hard to predict the change 
in share.  For example, if Firm A merges with Firm B, the industry will be more concentrated as a 
result and the analysis measures how that concentration changes as a result of the merger.  The 
concentration measure is based on the pre-merger market shares of the individual firms as in, for 
example, the HHI index of concentration which equals the sum of the squared market shares of 
firms.  So, if there are five firms, each with a market share of 20, and two merge so that the new   9
firm has a share of 40, the HHI rises from 2000 to 2800.  We then ask whether that increase 
warrants concern that price might rise.
7  Notice that I have assumed that the post-merger share of 
the merged firm equals the sum of the pre-merger shares.  That may be so the day after the merger, 
but need not remain so in the new equilibrium post-merger.  When it is not so, then this method 
will be inaccurate as a guide to predicting how price will change based on how industry 
concentration (which depends on market shares) will change.
8   And, of course, this analysis 
presumes that a change in concentration will cause a change in price, a relationship that may not be 
true.  Similarly, in a Section 2 context, one should be interested in answering how the alleged bad 
act alters the market share of the firm engaged in the action.  If there are not observations on 
market share both before and after the alleged bad act began, this could be a source of difficulty. 
 
III.  Getting it Exactly Right  
As a theoretical matter, if one knows the structure of demand for a product and all its 
substitutes, knows the cost curves of firms that currently produce (or could produce) the product, 
and knows the game that describes the competitive environment (e.g., static Cournot, static 
Bertrand, dynamic trigger strategies), then one can write down a model whose equilibrium reflects 
the outcome of all these economic forces.  This is of course a tall order, but it is critical to know 
what one would want to measure before turning to proxies, such as market share.   
Consider the case in which a merger is to occur.  Suppose that Firm A is a dominant firm 
facing a competitive fringe with supply curve S* (p).  Firm 1 wishes to merge with a large segment 
of the competitive fringe so that after merger the competitive fringe will have supply of only 
                                                 
7 In answering that question, the linkage between a change in HHI and a change in price could also 
depend on the level of HHI. 
 
8 This method can be adapted as long as one can use pre-merger shares to predict post-merger 
shares.  We show how this can be done in the next section.   10
S**(p) where S** < S*  for all p.  If industry demand is D (p), then the demand pre-merger facing 
the dominant firm is D (p) – S* (p) and the profit maximization yields that the pre-merger price p* 









, where   
                                                                     
  mc = marginal cost of Firm 1, 
  E* = elasticity of demand facing Firm 1 which equals  E
s
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D =  demand elasticity of D(p), 
  E
S = supply elasticity of S(p), and 
  s = share of sales of dominant firm. 
Landes and Posner (1981) use (1) to develop insights about how to define markets in their 
seminal 1981 paper.  It is of course easy to see that the deviation of price from marginal cost 
depends not only on share s (in of course the way intuition suggests:  the firm has more market 
power when s is larger), but also on E
D and E
S,, elasticity concepts that depend on how demand or 
supply changes as price changes.  A share will not necessarily reflect either of these elasticities 
accurately. 
If Firm 1 merges, then the exact calculation of how price changes is the difference between 
the pre-merger price p * and the post-merger price p ** which is calculated exactly as in  (1) but 
with S**(p) replacing S* (p).  We see that p ** will depend on not just how the merger affects the 
shares of the dominant firm but also on supply and demand elasticities.  We could enhance the 
model and recognize that the merger could lower Firm 1’s marginal cost, and that could easily be 
reflected in the calculation of p**.   11
We can expand the analysis to include market structures other than a homogeneous product 
with a dominant firm and competitive fringe.  Suppose, for example, that each firm i faces demand 
di(p1, ,p2 ….) where i=1….n is a listing of all products.  If we know each firm’s costs, and know the 
competitive game (e.g. Bertrand), we can solve for equilibrium prices pre-merger and post-merger.  
One does not necessarily need to know the cost curves if one is willing to specify the game.  For 
example, if the game is Bertrand, then one can use profit maximization to derive an equation like 
(1), and calculate mc from p and the elasticity.  This is a now standard type of merger simulation 
used to estimate so-called “unilateral” effects.   
There is no reason to limit these simulations to cases where Bertrand is the competitive 
game, where the competitive game remains unchanged pre and post merger, where product quality 
is unchanged, or to static situations.  If one allows for dynamic (repeated) games, one can address 
what the Guidelines call “coordinated effects”.  All of these complications are difficult to 
implement, but at least theoretically, these m odels allow the analyst to focus on what are the 
underlying forces that matter in influencing how the price will change as a result of the merger.  
These models show exactly why in the case of merger, market shares or changes in them, however 
measured, cannot possibly be anything but a crude guide to market power or its change, or to the 
change in price resulting from a merger.   
Now consider Section 2 cases.  In Section 2 cases, again the theoretically correct model can 
be described, though it may be difficult to implement in practice.  Let a be the alleged bad acts(s) 
and let a* be the act(s) that would occur if a were not allowed.  Then, the analyst needs to compare 
p(a) to p(a*) where p is the vector of all prices of the relevant products and a and a* are actions 
that influence demand (e.g., selling effort) and costs.  (The acts could also influence the types of 
competitive game.)  A full analysis of the competitive consequences of act a as compared to act a*
 
requires an analysis of not just prices, but also how the different acts affect the quality of the   12
product to (some) consumers.  For example, if  a represents vertical restrictions designed to 
increase sales information to the consumer, then the demand curve for a firm will be affected by 
whether a or a* occurs.  Similarly, the supply capabilities of the firm and its rivals could depend on 
Firm 1’s actions.  Taking these effects into account one can then calculate, at least theoretically, 
whether banning a and replacing it with a* leads to an increase in welfare.   
Let me summarize this section.  Although perhaps difficult to implement empirically, 
theoretical models produce clear results about how to calculate the effect of mergers or alleged bad 
acts under Section 2 on prices and consumer plus producer welfare.  I do not mean to suggest that 
the assumptions underlying the models are not contentious, or that these models can easily be 
implemented.
9  I do mean that theory tells us how price and welfare will be determined and 
therefore theory tells us how to calculate the effect of either mergers or Section 2 behavior.   
There is no model that I am aware of where market share (or more precisely its change) is 
the only variable that matters in predicting the change in either price or welfare.  Moreover, it is 
clear from most models, especially those involving differentiated products, that there is no 
theoretical need even to define a “market” to get to the correct answer.  At best, market definition 
and market shares can be used as a shortcut to start the analysis, especially when the correct 
analysis is hard to do.   
Merger cases are typically much easier to analyze than Section 2 cases.  Merger cases will 
usually be handled by answering whether price will rise as a result of the merger.  Section 2 cases 
will usually be handled by asking whether the price increase is offset by some beneficial product 
change.  A focus on the level of market power (rather than its change) can allow a court to provide 
a safe harbor for either merger or Section 2 behavior if the level of market power after the merger 
                                                 
9 See Carlton (2003, 2004) for a critique of how these models have been used.   13
or alleged bad act is low.  Courts often use market share to decide that market power is low and we 
now turn to an examination of whether they can do that in a rigorous way. 
   
IV.  Market Definition 
We have seen that the theoretically correct analysis may be difficult to implement 
empirically.  In such cases, it is reasonable to resort to a simpler analysis as a first step and that is 
exactly what market definition and the use of market shares is designed to do.  I will discuss 
merger cases separately from Section 2 cases because, as I have already explained, merger cases 
are logically easier to analyze. 
   
  A.  Market Definition in Merger Cases 
    1.  Mergers -  Theory of Market Definition 
  In a merger case, one uses market shares to calculate industry concentration so as to 
determine the level of industry concentration and the change in industry concentration as a result of 
the merger.  The implicit assumption is that increases in industry concentration lead to increases in 
price.  (The effect of any particular change in concentration could depend on the level of 
concentration.)  A typical starting assumption is that the post-merger share of the merged firm 
equals the sum of the pre-merger shares of the merging firms.  This of course may not be so as, for 
example, when entry is easy.  In such a case, the use of pre-merger market shares in this way may 
be inappropriate.  But let’s suppose that we are in an industry where post-merger the share of the 
merged firm is well predicted by the sum of the pre-merger shares of the merging firms, so that the 
use of pre-merger market shares is sensible.  There are two virtually equivalent ways to define 
markets.     14
One is to rely on demand substitution to identify products and the geographic areas where 
they are sold and then separately to consider as market participants all those who would supply the 
product at the current price plus, say 5%.  This is roughly the approach of the Merger Guidelines.   
A second and virtually equivalent approach is to combine this procedure into one step and define 
the market to include all those products and areas that constrain prices of the product under 
analysis from either the demand or supply side.  Product A is a demand substitute for Product B if 
a price increase in B causes consumers to substitute to A.  Product A is a supply substitute for 
Product B, if a price increase in B causes firms that produce A to shift their capacity to the 
production of B.   
To see the difference between the two alternative ways of defining a market, consider the 
following example.  There are two products, nails and screws.  Consumers do not substitute 
between them, so there is no substitution on the demand side.  A monopolist of nails could 
profitably raise price by 5% above current levels as a result of a merger of all current and potential 
nail producers.  Firm A makes screws, but could and would switch to producing nails if the price of 
nails rose by 5%, holding constant the price of screws, so there is supply substitution.  Under the 
Merger Guidelines’ approach, the market is nails, but when calculating shares, one considers all 
those nails that would be produced by Firm A and other firms if nail prices rose 5%.
10  Under the 
second approach, the market would consist of nails plus screws (somehow appropriately weighted, 
perhaps by value), and shares would be calculated accordingly.  I will follow the first approach, but 
                                                 
10 Typically, one uses the likely “capacity” of the firm to produce nails as a measure of its market 
participation.  Needless to say, capacity can be hard to measure or even define.  As a technical 
matter, this artifice of holding constant all prices of products outside the market need not be a 
correct description of what would happen if the price of the product under analysis rose.  For 
example, in the example in the text, the price of screws could rise as screw producers start 
producing nails, causing less switching to nails than in the text.  This strikes me as one of many 
details that should not matter to the analysis and if they do, the analyst must think hard about the 
underlying economics using the theory of the previous section. 
        15
recognize that the second approach can also be a sensible way to proceed.   Since market shares are 
only crude proxies for market power, these roughly equivalent approaches for calculating shares 
should not differ and, if they do, one should delve deeper into the underlying economics.
11     
The Merger Guidelines recognize the need to define a time dimension, a magnitude of 
increase and a benchmark price to approach the question of whether a merger raises an antitrust 
concern by increasing market power.  For example, one could ask whether after the merger prices 
could be profitably increased above current levels
12 by a significant amount (e.g., 5%) for a 
significant time (e.g., 2 years).  The Guidelines define a market to be consistent with this phrasing 
of the issue.  A market is defined by thinking about a hypothetical monopolist.  A monopolist of all 
of the products in  a market would raise price profitability above current levels by, say 5%, for 
some time, say two years, on the assumption that the prices of all the products excluded from the 
market remain unchanged.  In this thought experiment of using a hypothetical monopolist, there is 
not necessarily a unique set of products that determines the market, nor is there an unambiguous 
methodology of how to raise the price of each product in the market (should each go up by 5% or 
just on average rise by 5%?)
13.  These strike me as details that again, if they matter, would cause 
                                                 
11 Proxies obviously can lead to erroneous conclusions under certain hypotheticals.  I am not saying 
that these two approaches always yield the same result, but if they don’t one should re-examine the 
underlying economics to make sure it is not a peculiarity of the proxy that is generating a strange 
result.  See Baker (2006). 
 
12 The Guidelines use the expected future price if that can be predicted to be different from the 
current price.  They also indicate they may use the competitive price if the current price exceeds it.  
The logic for the latter approach presumably is that the competitiveness of the industry is expected 
to increase in the future.   
 
13 One could add the condition, as the Guidelines do, that one use the smallest market and when it 
is necessary to add products to the candidate market one adds products to the market sequentially 
with the “closest” substitute product to the candidate market being added.  Regarding which 
“price” to focus on, one could focus on the price of the products of the firms involved in the 
transaction when asking whether price will rise and one could assume that the hypothetical   16
me to pause about the usefulness of the proxy of market shares and to delve more deeply into the 
underlying economics as described in the previous section.   
Aside from determining which products belong in the market, one must determine the 
geographic scope of the market.  I would handle this in the same ways as product market definition 
is handled: by treating location as a product characteristic and asking the same type of questions as 
one does for inclusion of a product in the market.  For example, apples in Chicago are in the same 
market as apples in Milwaukee, if an increase in the price of apples in Chicago would induce 
buyers to switch to buying apples in Milwaukee in such quantities as to defeat a price increase.  
Suppose no buyer would literally go to Milwaukee to buy these apples, but instead that DC 
Transport would pick them up and bring them to sell in Chicago.  Technically, DC Transport has 
become a market participant in the market for apples in Chicago.  Alternatively stated, there is 
supply substitution between apples in Milwaukee and those in Chicago.  I would treat these two 
cases -- one involving the buyer traveling, the other involving DC Transport traveling -- in the 
same way.  One could define the market to be apples in Milwaukee and Chicago, or one could 
define it using the other approach, in which the market is only Chicago, but DC Transport is a 





                                                                                                                                                                 
monopolist sets the price of each product in the market optimally.  I return to these points in the 
next section. 
 
14The Guidelines define the geographic area based on the location of production, not consumption.  
Although this initially may seem odd, it really is not.  Because there is an assumption of no 
geographic price discrimination in this part of the Guidelines, they come to the same result as I do 
above.  Notice that the prices in Chicago and Milwaukee become linked in my example. 
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2.  Merger -- Practical Implementation of Market Definition 
 The theory underlying market definition for mergers is logically coherent.  A separate issue 
is whether it is implementable.  It is possible to describe an econometric procedure to define 
markets (See, e.g., Werden (2002)).  For any set of products ( a1,  a2……….an), estimate 
econometrically a demand system in which the demand for product ai depends on its own price and 
that of all other products.  Suppose that product 1 is the product under analysis, such as when two 
producers of product 1 want to merge, and that we have ordered the products so that product 2 is 
the closest substitute for (product 1) and so on.
15   Now, assuming costs are known, calculate the 
price that a monopolist of just a1 would charge.  If that price exceeds the current average price for 
a1  by, say, a 5%, stop.  If not, add a2, and calculate the optimal prices for a1 and a2.  If (by some 
measure) the average price of a1 and a2 rises above current levels by, say, a 5%, stop.  If not, 
continue.  In this way, a market can be defined.   
This econometric approach requires a tremendous amount of information about a demand 
system, information that is typically not available.  Moreover, if it were available it seems odd to 
use it only in this way.  The reason is that with such a detailed demand system available, it might 
well make sense to calculate directly the effect of the proposed merger.  This can be done by a 
merger simulation, as described in the previous section, where one uses the demand system 
combined w ith various assumptions of the competitive game (e.g., Cournot or Bertrand) and 
                                                 
15 It is a bit tricky to define exactly what one means by closest substitute to a1.  One could say it is 
the product a2 such that the joint pricing of a1  and  a2 allows the price of a1 to be the highest.   
When the market consists of more than one product, it is less clear what a unique sensible 
definition is and differences in this definition can lead to differences in the products included in the 
market.  Moreover, the procedure of adding the closest substitute does not necessarily lead to the 
smallest market in which a hypothetical monopolist would raise the price of  a1 by 5%.  Again, 
these strike me as details that if they mattered to the analysis then one should examine more deeply 
the underlying economics. 
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perhaps cost, to predict what the new pricing will be if there is a merger.
16  This direct approach 
requires no market definition, but utilizes all the same information required to define a market.  It 
is a much more refined way of making predictions on pricing than one based solely on market 
share.  Indeed, this methodology can also account for the fact that products outside “the market” 
can affect the price under analysis and the prices of those products may themselves change in 
response to the merger, in contrast to the procedures for market definition under the Guidelines.
17  
Market definition, with its dichotomous “in” or “out” classification, is a crude simplification and a 
merger simulation can be a more accurate approach that automatically takes account of demand 
and supply substitutability.   
The drawback of merger simulation is that it requires not only extensive demand 
estimation, but assumptions about how firms will compete.  Even if one has information on the 
former, many are uncomfortable about assumptions on the latter.  (See, Carlton (2004)).   
There are really two responses to this reluctance to use merger simulation.  The merger 
simulation, when done under different assumptions, is really a way of revealing to the analyst the 
constraints on pricing that the demand system imposes and makes transparent all the underlying 
assumptions.  The different merger simulations allow the analyst to see whether these constraints 
hold under a variety of assumptions.  Second, if instead of doing a merger simulation, one defines a 
market and uses pre-merger market shares to calculate the change in the HHI, one is assuming that 
these market shares allow one to predict the price effect of a merger.  That is, the price is assumed 
post-merger to depend on (pre-merger) market shares in a simple way (e.g., price is assumed to 
                                                 
16 As discussed in the previous section, one could at least theoretically assume a repeated game 
(and so deal with a “coordinated effects” analysis).  Although possible in theory, such simulations 
are not commonly used in antitrust matters, unlike merger simulations based on static games (e.g, 
Bertrand). 
 
17 The Guidelines would look at price changes in other products, entry responses, and other supply 
responses, but after the market is defined.   19
depend on just the HHI).  There is no such model that I am aware of that has this property.  There 
are models in which price depends on current concentration and other things such as elasticities, 
but not only are those models premised on assumptions that may not be relevant to the industry 
under analysis, worse yet, in such models there may not be a profit incentive to merge.
18  (See, 
Salant et al. (1983), Farrell and Shapiro (1990)).  This is all a very long way of saying that the use 
of changes in market shares to calculate the change in the HHI is a very crude methodology for 
predicting whether a merger will increase price.  The use of market shares is at best viewed as a 
crude merger simulation, but lacks the logical consistency underlying merger simulation.  Its main 
attractiveness is its simplicity.   
But there is a further problem.  I had assumed that a detailed econometric demand system 
together with knowledge of costs was available.  When it is not, then it is not possible to delineate 
a market with the precision that its definition demands.
19  Instead, one attempts to use various types 
of evidence to do one’s best  to see whether the price constraining effect of one product upon 
another will be sufficient to prevent a significant price rise.  Although the clear theoretical 
construct of market definition can guide one, the absence of estimates of the demand (or cost) 
system subject this exercise to possible error and arbitrary judgments.  These errors can be 
mitigated by some of the types of econometric studies that I describe in the next section.   
One alternative path to market definition in the absence of detailed econometric estimates 
of a demand system is simply to ask consumers to which products they would turn if price of the 
                                                 
18 For example, in a Cournot model with constant returns to scale, one can show that  
(P- C)/P = HHI/E where P is price, C is cost, E is the absolute value of the industry demand 
elasticity and HHI is the sum of squared market shares.   
 
19 To define a market using the hypothetical monopolist test, one must specify marginal cost.  To 
do a merger simulation, one could also use cost information, or alternatively infer cost from the 
profit maximizing conditions that emerge from equilibrium of the assumed competitive game. 
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product under analysis rose by, say, 5%.  Notice that this set of products does not satisfy the 
market definition under the Guidelines because it may include products that attract so few switches 
that those products would not prevent a price increase.   Therefore, although this method is simple, 
markets defined in this way will tend to be overbroad unless one includes only those products for 
which there is “significant substitution” (how much is “significant”? – well if I define it precisely 
then I am back to an approach like that of the Merger Guidelines).  However, consumer responses 
as to their switching possibilities can give one a rough estimate of demand price elasticities and 
cross elasticities, and those can assist in defining a market.  (See Heyer (2007) for a more skeptical 
view of the value of relying on consumer responses.)
 20 
I have not discussed “critical loss analysis” (see, Harris and Simons (1989)), because it is 
not an alternative method for defining markets.  When done correctly (as Harris and Simons 
recognize), it is simply a rephrasing of the hypothetical monopolist test.  It asks what is the critical 
amount of demand that has to be lost in response to a price rise before the price rise is unprofitable.  
That is a question about how big the demand elasticity has to be to make a price increase 
unprofitable.  Critical loss can help one describe this critical demand elasticity, but it is not a new 
analytic tool and has been misused.  See Carlton (2004). 
The methodology of market definition and market shares is an extremely crude way of 
assessing a merger’s competitive effect, especially since market definition is usually not based on 
the extensive quantitative information required to define it rigorously.  The methodology can 
certainly be informative in many cases, but it is only the first step in an analysis that must delve 
into the economic facts of the industry.  It can be a useful guide, but only if subsequent analysis 
                                                 
20 One implementable procedure to define markets is to identify products whose prices are highly 
correlated.  Stigler and Sherwin (1985) recommend this procedure.  Although it has quite serious 
drawbacks (see, Carlton and Perloff (2005), Chapter 20 and Werden and Froeb (1993)), the 
procedure can sometimes be a useful way to start an analysis.   21
confirms its message.  The methodology’s 0 or 1 nature (is a product in or out of the market?) 
together with the arbitrariness of certain decisions (e.g., why hold the price of products outside the 
market constant?), emphasizes its crudeness.  Still, the use of market shares (or changes in them) is 
simple, and it can be thought of as the first step in a merger analysis.  Its best use is likely to 
provide a safe harbor when industry concentration and shares of merging firms are low. 
   
B.  Market Definition in Section 2 Cases 
We have already discussed how the central issue in a Section 2 case is whether some 
alleged bad act enables additional market power to be exercised, and, if so, whether any exercise 
of additional market power is offset by the additional provision of valuable services made 
profitable as a result of the price increase.  Estimating market power while adjusting for services 
provided can be difficult and it is even more difficult to figure out if an increase in market power 
is offset by improved services – the traditional pro-competitive explanation for many alleged bad 
acts. 
Instead of focusing on whether the alleged bad act increases market power, the courts 
typically focus on whether there is market power and, if so, whether the alleged bad act is justified 
on pro-competitive grounds.  One reason, I think, for this current emphasis on the level of market 
power (whether it is measured before or after the bad act often seems not to be a focus of 
attention) is because at the summary judgment stage, a case can be thrown out  if there is no 
market power, while it is thought to be more difficult to get the case thrown out at summary 
judgment if one concedes market power but defends by claiming that the action is pro-
competitive.  Because the courts focus on existing levels of market power, this has required 
markets to be defined in Section 2 cases to see whether market power exists (presumably, after the 
alleged bad act has occurred).  My experience is that courts ask whether market power exists in   22
the presence of the alleged bad act, a question with the potential to be answered in a misleading 
way if one ignores the efficiency justification for the alleged bad act, as I explained in a previous 
section.  Moreover, such an analysis fails to consider whether the “bad” act creates any additional 
market power.  Still, the procedure does have a logic because if there is no market power after the 
alleged bad act, then the antitrust inquiry ends. 
To answer the question of whether the firm has market power, some have tried to adapt the 
procedure of the Merger Guidelines to define a market in a Section 2 context.  As a logical matter, 
this initially seems fine with the benchmark price now no longer being the current price but rather 
the competitive price.  So the hypothetical monopolist test to define a market is as follows:  
consider all those products such that a hypothetical monopolist of those products would raise 
price above the competitive level by, say, 5%. One then calculates the market share of the firm in 
this market and if it is high one concludes that there is market power.  But what sense does this 
make?  Suppose the current price is $10.  If one knows that the competitive price is $5, the market 
definition exercise is  useless!  One can observe whether the current price($10) exceeds the 
competitive price($5) and the deviation is the measure of market power.  There is no need to 
define a market and calculate market share in order to see whether the market share is so high that 
one can safely conclude that $10 is higher than $5.  Alternatively, if, one does not know the 
competitive price, there is no way to implement this market definition test.
21   
But a bit more analysis shows that the logic of using the competitive price as the benchmark 
price is not necessarily correct.  In a merger case, we use the current price as the benchmark, not 
the competitive price.  That is sensible because the relevant question is whether the merger will 
raise price from current levels.  By similar logic, in a Section 2 case we should use the price that 
                                                 
21 It is also correct to say that in the absence of cost information, one cannot define a market in a 
merger case using the Guidelines in the rigorous way I described earlier. 
   23
would prevail in the absence of the “bad” act as the benchmark price in order to define a market 
and calculate market shares in an effort to determine whether the firm has enough market power 
so that it could possibly use (or have used) the “bad” act to elevate price.
22   The hypothetical 
monopolist test for market definition in a Section 2 case should be:  include all those products 
such that the hypothetical monopolist would raise price by 5% above the benchmark price defined 
as the price that would prevail absent the “bad” act.  If the firm’s market share is low, the inquiry 
should end.
23  It may sometimes be difficult to figure out that benchmark price, though not 
always.  For example, if the “bad” act has not yet taken effect, the current price can be used as the 
benchmark price.
24  But when, as will commonly occur, this is not the case, the analyst could have 
difficulty.   
In this situation, one is in the uncomfortable position of realizing  how arbitrary market 
definition can be in Section 2 cases and how this arbitrariness can lead to errors.  Perhaps the best 
one can say is that one might look at “similar” firms and throw out the antitrust case if there are 
enough of them-but that is a cop out unless one can define what “similar” means.   If one is able 
to establish a benchmark price because there is a consensus that in some areas (or time periods) 
there are no bad acts, one can then use econometric techniques to try to use those benchmark 
areas and their characteristics to calculate the benchmark price in any area.  This can be a useful 
approach, and one I describe in the next section. 
                                                 
22If possible, the expected post bad act market share of the firm should be used.  
 
23 If one concludes that there is market power, then as described previously, one should compare 
the price effect of the “bad” act to any efficiency effects associated with the “bad” act.  The change 
in market share pre and post “bad” act may give insight into the likely price effect. 
24 If the benchmark price is known and the price after the “bad” act is known, then, as already 
explained, there is no need to go to the effort to define a market.  If the benchmark price is not 
known, one cannot define the correct market.  If the benchmark price is known, but the price after 
the “bad” act is not known, then one may benefit from defining a market and asking whether the 
“bad” act is likely to allow the firm to achieve a sufficiently high market share that market power 
concerns arise.  If not, the inquiry ends.   24
 
V.  Is Market Definition a Useful Tool for Understanding Market Behavior? 
So far I have discussed market definition only in the context of antitrust cases, but what 
about as a research tool to understand economic behavior?  Should economists study market 
definition and market shares in their academic research and if so wouldn’t such studies be relevant 
in antitrust cases?  It is undeniable that most of the current interest in market definition stems from 
its use in antitrust cases.  But, although it is no longer as popular as it once was, there was a 
flourishing literature in relating market performance to market structure measured by market 
shares.  This literature has been heavily criticized (See, e.g., Chapter 8 of Carlton and Perloff 
(2005)) because, among other reasons, a market share does not have the same economic effect 
across industries, which differ enormously, and because market share is an  outcome of industry 
fundamentals, not a basic characteristic of them.  Such studies are sometimes still used in academic 
studies and can be done properly.  They are used in antitrust studies and, under appropriate 
circumtstances, can be a powerful tool not just for checking market definition, but for 
understanding the economic behavior of the industry.  (See, e.g., Carlton and Sider (1999) and 
Carlton (2003, 2004)).   
Consider a proposed merger between two firms.  One may well be able to use the past 
historical relationship between price and concentration to predict the effect of the merger.  One 
could use regression analysis to estimate this relationship, though caution is needed to deal with the 
determination on concentration.
25  Simply analyzing the relation between price and concentration 
over time may tell one nothing about the relation of competitiveness to concentration absent a 
theory explaining why concentration might be changing over time.  However, it is sometimes 
                                                 
25 The statistical issue is whether concentration should be treated as an exogenous or endogenous 
variable.   25
possible to construct such theories and to use the estimated relationship between price and 
concentration as a predictor of a merger’s effects.  For example, in the railroad industry where 
tracks were laid many years ago, it seems sensible to predict the effect of a merger of two railroads 
that will reduce the number of railroads serving a route from 3 to 2 by comparing pricing on routes 
with 3 railroads to those with 2, after adjusting for other route characteristics.  In fact, a recent 
paper (Peters  (2007)) analyzing the airline industry shows that such predictions based on the 
historical relationship of price to concentration are often as or more accurate than those based on 
merger simulation.   
Such econometric studies can also shed light on the appropriate market definition.  For 
example, suppose there is a question whether Product B is in the same market with Product A.  A 
regression reveals that there is a relation between the price of Product A and market concentration 
based on a market definition excluding Product B, but no relation based on a market definition 
including Product B.  Under appropriate statistical circumstances, that can be quite informative as 
to the correct market definition and can indicate that Product B is not in the same market as 
Product A.  I have often found these types of econometric analyses helpful in understanding both 
market definition and predicting the consequence of mergers.  (See, Carlton (2003) and the similar 
views of Coleman and Scheffman (2003)).   
Similarly, in the context of Section 2 cases, one can use econometric techniques to explore 
the direct effect of a “bad” act if one is fortunate enough to have data on periods when the “bad” 
act was in use and not in use.  Again, one has to make sure that one can deal with the statistical 
issue of exogeneity properly, but if so these studies can be valuable.  One can also use the same 
type of studies as just described in the merger context to test which definitions of market make 
sense and are useful for prediction.  
   26
VI.  Common Mistakes in Defining Markets 
Although I have stressed the limitations of the methodology of using market definition and 
market share, I have also explained that the methodology still can sometimes be useful if done in a 
way that captures the underlying economics, especially in the context of merger cases.  In this 
section, I list a few of what I have found to be common mistakes: 
1.  Firm 2 is producing at capacity.  Hence, it cannot increase supply to offset a 
hypothetical price increase by Firm 1 , and accordingly should be excluded as a 
participant from the market.   
This logic correctly recognizes that Firm 2’s zero supply elasticity means that increases in 
Firm 2’s output cannot constrain Firm 1’s price.  But it fails to recognize that Firm 2’s existing 
production constrains Firm 1’s ability to raise price.  Suppose it costs $1 to make one unit of 
wheat.  In equilibrium, 1000 units are sold at $1 each.  Imagine 1000 wheat farmers including 
Firms 1 and 2 each of whom produces one (and only one) unit.  Each wheat farmer likely faces a 
highly elastic demand precisely because of the output of the others, and would on its own be 
unable to increase the price of wheat.  Excluding capacity constrained wheat farmers would 
incorrectly indicate that Firm 1 has market power.
26 
2.  Firm 1 produces steel.  It has several long-term customers.  The capacity to 
serve those customers should not be considered in calculating the market for 
steel in evaluating a merger involving other firms. 
If the customers have signed long term fixed price contracts with Firm 1, but the steel can 
be resold, then the capacity to produce that steel should be in the market, but should not be 
attributed to Firm 1.  If the steel cannot be resold, the contract will not be breached, and the output 
                                                 
26 The elasticity of the residual demand curve facing a single farmer equals E/s where E is the 
aggregate demand elasticity and s is the market share of our single farmer.  This elasticity facing a 
farmer will be large for small s.   27
produced by these customers does not affect other customers of steel, then the steel sold to these 
customers should be excluded from the market.  However, if the output of these customers does 
constrain the prices of the products of other steel customers,  then the steel output to these 
customers should be included in the market, but should not be attributed to Firm 1.  The presence 
of these customers constrains the price that these other steel customers can pay for steel.  If there is 
no fixed price contract, then the capacity is attributable to Firm 1.  The price to long term 
customers will be set in the marketplace where the price reflects competition amongst many other 
steel producers. 
3.  Used goods sell for a lower price than new goods and therefore are not part of 
the same market as new goods. 
Used goods sell for a lower price than new goods for many reasons ,including the fact that 
they have fewer years of service to provide.  Whether they are in the same market as new goods 
depends on how good a substitute they are for various demanders.  For example, if used goods 
have greater reliability problems than new goods, there may be a class of consumers willing to pay 
a (length adjusted) price that reflects a premium for the reliability.  That could mean that used and 
new goods do not tightly constrain each other’s prices, but that is an empirical question.  See, 
Carlton and Gertner (1989). 
 
VII.  Market Definition in Complicated Settings 
  I now discuss two somewhat complicated settings and see how useful market definition 
can be.  Since we have already seen its limitations in even relatively simple settings, we should not 
be surprised that its limitations are even more severe as the circumstances become more 
complicated.  We discuss two settings.  One is where R & D is important.  In such settings, I ask 
whether it is sensible to think of an “R & D innovation market”, a concept that was used by the   28
Department of Justice in the 1990s.  The second setting is one involving what are called “two-sided 
markets”.  (See, Evans and Schmalensee (2005) and Rochet and Tirole (2004)).  These are markets 
where multiple inputs and outputs require coordination in order to produce desirable products.  
One example is a mall in which the mall owner must account for the fact that some stores attract 
customers to the mall, yet those customers buy at other stores in the mall.  Another example is an 
operating system for computers, where the owner of the operating system wishes to induce 
application programmers to write applications programs for its operating system so as to make its 
operating system attractive to users.  In such cases, there are interactions between different “sides” 
of the market that should be internalized.  So, for example, the mall owner subsidizes the rent of 
the bookstore, but charges a high rent to the restaurant.  Or, the owner of the operating system 
subsidizes application programmers, but charges users a high price for the operating system.  Other 
common examples of two-sided markets include dating clubs, game stations and games, and card 
payment systems. As far as I know, there has been no recognition yet  by courts of market 
definition in two-sided markets. 
 
A.  Innovation Markets 
An innovation market consists of the future innovations in some area, presumably measured by the 
resources devoted to R & D in the particular area.  (Gilbert and Sunshine (1995)).  Shares are 
calculated for each firm in the obvious way.  Notice that this analysis is focused on an input (R & 
D) not the output of the R & D (new products).  It is a departure from the usual procedures of 
basing market definition on products.  It would be a justifiable procedure if it were easy to predict 
which R & D will lead to which new product, but in many (most?) cases it is not possible to do 
this.  The success of R & D is highly uncertain and predicting from where R & D breakthroughs 
will come from is very hard.  Perhaps pharmaceuticals are an exception because one can see   29
exactly how far along a drug development is in its FDA trials.  Yet a market for particular drugs in 
development really is not an R & D market, instead it is a market for a future product (uncertain as 
it may be).  This is different from a market based on R & D for a particular general type of product.  
Moreover, we lack a theoretical framework for defining markets for R & D innovation markets. 
What is the analogue to a 5% price increase?.  What price is being measured if the product cannot 
be defined?  Furthermore, the link between R & D concentration and new product output is quite 
weak (see, Gilbert (2005)).  For all these reasons, I am skeptical that the already crude theoretical 
construct of “market” can be of much use in analyzing industries where R & D is key.  (See, 
Carlton and Gertner (2003) for a more detailed critique.) 
 
  B.  Two-Sided Markets 
In two-sided markets, one party (e.g, mall developer, owner of a computer operating 
system) internalizes the externalities across agents by effectively taxing and subsidizing different 
groups so that a “total package” is produced.  There has been a literature questioning the empirical 
relevance of these two-sided markets (or the related concept of industries with network 
economies).   In such markets, without the coordinating ability of a third party, markets cannot 
produce the efficient result.  The lack of a third party could then indicate either no need for one or 
the existence of a market failure.  (See, Liebowitz and Margolis (1994)).
27  For purposes of this 
discussion, I assume that a third party is needed and does exist in order to coordinate activity 
among different groups.  What is a sensible procedure to define a market in such a case?  
                                                 
27  For example, when cars were being developed, the car manufacturers could have perhaps 
benefited from subsidizing location of gas stations and standardization of fuel standards if there 
were scale economies initially in such activities.  The fact that no such subsidization occurred 
shows either the market was inefficient, or alternatively, that whatever inefficiency existed, it was 
too small to cause it to be corrected.   
   30
To take a concrete example, suppose two shopping malls want to merge.
28  To simplify, 
assume that there are no surrounding competing retail stores that are not in malls.  We start out by 
recognizing that a mall owner puts together a portfolio of stores that complement each other and 
whose existence he coordinates by lowing the rent of one type of store to stimulate demand (and 
elevate rent) at another.   Suppose that the mall owner charges each store a rent based on its retail 
sales.  Following an approach similar to the Guidelines, we ask which nearby malls must a 
hypothetical monopolist control in order for it to be profitable for the merged firm to raise the 
“price” by, say 5%.  But just as in the earlier discussion of market definition when multiple 
substitutes were in the market, one must define what “price means.  Is it the rent of one particular 
retail store, average rent or total rent that has to rise?  In the earlier discussion of market definition 
when the market contained multiple products, I recognized the ambiguity in the definition of 
“price” but said that I doubted that it should matter much, though I indicated a preference to focus 
on the products of the merging firms, rather than all products in the market.  But here, there is no 
one type of retail store to focus on.
29  Therefore, one should focus on an aggregate measure of rent.  
Moreover, we know that because of the two-sided nature of the m arket it is unlikely that it is 
optimal for the hypothetical monopolist to raise rents to all stores by 5%.  Indeed, the whole point 
                                                 
28 For an application of market definition to credit cards, see Emch and Thompson (2006). 
 
29 Notice that the product is “malls”, not individual retail stores.  If one does mistakenly focus on 
rent to only a particular type of retail store, one must recognize the two-sided nature of the market 
in which feedback effects occur in other retail stores in the mall.  An increase in the percent of 
sales charged as rent to the bookstore could lead to higher book prices and fewer customers to the 
bookstore and, thereby, to all other stores in the mall.  The fall in mall customers leads to a decline 
in sales in other retail stores and a decline in rents from these stores.  Failure to understand this 
feedback effect could lead one to overestimate the profitability to the mall owner of raising rents to 
the bookstore and, thereby, lead one to define markets too narrowly and overestimate market 
power. 
 
   Notice that this type of feedback effect can also arise in one-sided markets, when a firm sells 
complementary products.  The price increase in one product will adversely affect sales of the other, 
and that effect will temper the profitability of a price increase in the initial product.   31
of having a mall is to charge different rents to different types of stores.  Failure to allow the 
hypothetical monopolist t o set rents optimally could lead one to a misleading market definition.  
For example, one might conclude that post-merger there is no market power (i.e., a very broad 
market in which the post-merger mall owner has a small share) when with optimal pricing t he 
market is narrower and the mall owner has a large market share reflecting market power created by 
the merger.  My sense is that this problem of using the right “price” will make market definition in 
two-sided markets more difficult than in the typical case and will therefore further limit reliability 
of market definition and market shares. 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
Market definition is a crude though sometimes useful tool for identifying market power.  
The ambiguity in what analysts mean by market power (price a bove marginal cost, or excess 
profits) cannot be resolved by market share.  When being used to analyze a merger or Section 2 
case, it is not just the level of market share, but the changes in market shares that are relevant to 
calculate whether any increase in market power occurs.  Despite this, in Section 2 cases courts 
often use market definition to figure out whether market power exists, a question that we have 
shown can be especially problematic to answer by using market definition.  In Section 2 cases, the 
full antitrust analysis is difficult because any increase in market power typically has to be weighed 
against any benefits of the alleged bad act.  The procedure for defining a market in a merger case 
or Section 2 case can be rigorously described, but the information required to implement the 
procedure is typically unavailable.  Few analysts (or courts) follow the rigorous procedure in either 
merger or Section 2 cases.  Instead, most markets are defined with some guidance from theory and 
some qualitative knowledge.  Econometric studies using market definition may be helpful both in   32
testing various definitions and in understanding the economic consequences of either the merger or 
“bad” act.   
My own view is that the definition of a market and the use of market shares and changes in 
market shares are at best crude first steps to begin an analysis.  I would use them to eliminate 
frivolous antitrust cases when shares are low, but would use them cautiously for anything else.  
Their usefulness in Section 2 cases is especially weak.  Despite their limitations, when they can be 
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